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An engineering company would not be vicariously liable where, without more, an employee 
sexually assaulted another employee on the employer’s premises: carrying on an engineering 
business does not (as far as we know) materially increase the risk of assaults between 
employees on the employer’s premises.
Majrowski offers limited guidance on this issue, although Lord Nicholls stated that 
“[i]n most cases courts should have little diffi culty in applying the ‘close connection’ 
test”.11  I am far from convinced. I strongly suspect that establishing when an employer 
has created, or at least increased, a risk of harassment is likely to prove troublesome.
Douglas Brodie
University of Edinburgh
Wainwright v United Kingdom: Bringing Human 
Rights Home?
A. BRINGING HUMAN RIGHTS HOME TO ENGLAND
When the European Convention on Human Rights became directly enforceable in the 
United Kingdom by virtue of the Human Rights Act 1998, the government declared 
that it was bringing “human rights home”.1  For the sceptical, however, the puzzle was 
how English law, a remedies-based system, would accommodate the Convention, a 
rights-based document. That confl ict was particularly apparent in relation to privacy. 
The right to privacy was clearly within the ambit of Article 8 of the Convention, but 
it had not previously been protected by any specifi c English remedy.2 Nonetheless, 
Lord Irvine of Lairg, the then Lord Chancellor, pronounced that the government 
was “not introducing a privacy statute”;3 and, although a cull of “sacred cows” was 
predicted,4 the judiciary, in varying degrees, was unpersuaded that the creation of a 
tort of invasion of privacy was, in the fi rst place, within the bounds of judicial creativity 
or, in the second place, necessary. By 2003, Gavin Phillipson refl ected in relation 
to privacy that the English courts had “not even gone as far as enquiring explicitly 
whether the common law is in harmony with the Convention, let alone determining 
what should be done if it is not”.5
And so the “P word”6 has remained largely unspoken in the English courts. Although 
11 [2006] 3 WLR 125 at para 30.
1 HL Deb 3 Nov 1997 col 1228 (Lord Irvine of Lairg), echoing the Labour Party’s 1997 manifesto 
pledge.
2 See Kaye v Robertson [1991] FSR 62; R v Khan [1997] AC 558; but see also Khan v United Kingdom 
(2000) 31 EHRR 1016.
3 HL Deb 3 Nov 1997 col  1229.
4 By Lord Slynn in R v Lambert [2002] 2 AC 545 at para 6.
5 “Towards a common law right of privacy” (2003) 66 MLR 726 at 731.
6 The expression coined by Lord Justice Sedley in “Towards a right to privacy” London Review of Books 
8 June 2006.
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Article 8 has frequently been invoked, privacy has been protected piecemeal, using 
extra-judicial codes of practice,7 statutory remedies such as under the Protection from 
Harassment Act 1997 and the Data Protection Act 1998, and by drawing upon a range 
of other torts, such as trespass, nuisance, defamation and malicious falsehood,8 and the 
law of passing off.9  A further, crucial, development has been the remarkable expan-
sion of breach of confi dence – in England an equitable, not a tortious, doctrine.
In the classic formulation of breach of confi dence, an action lay where information: 
had the necessary quality of confi dence; was imparted in circumstances importing an 
obligation of confi dence; and was used in an unauthorised way to the detriment of the 
original party communicating it.10  However, the English courts have accommodated 
a wide range of privacy cases within breach of confi dence by progressive reinterpre-
tation of the second requirement (obligation of confi dence). In Attorney-General v 
Guardian Newspapers (the “Spycatcher” case), Lord Goff observed that a duty of 
confi dence could arise “in equity” between parties where there was no contractual 
or similar relationship,11 and these remarks have formed the basis for the extension 
of the doctrine to situations where there is little if any previous relationship between 
defendant and owner of the confi dential information. Private information may have 
been obtained by subterfuge, for example by a rogue photographer taking surrepti-
tious photographs of an unwitting and unwilling subject.12 Nevertheless, in the words 
of Lord Nicholls in the leading recent case of Campbell v MGN:13
This cause of action has now fi rmly shaken off the limiting constraint of the need for an 
initial confi dential relationship… Now the law imposes a “duty of confi dence” whenever 
a person receives information he knows or ought to know is fairly and reasonably to be 
regarded as confi dential.
As yet, however, breach of confi dence has not proved infi nitely elastic in England. 
The need for a pre-existing confi dential relationship may have been discarded, but 
information must still “have the necessary quality of confi dence”. The diffi culty is 
that all that is private, meriting protection under Article 8, cannot necessarily be 
“shoe-horned”14 into the defi nition of confi dential. Privacy may have been invaded 
in a public place, in which case it is artifi cial to argue that confi dentiality has been 
breached.15 Or private information may have lost confi dentiality through publication, 
but still be suffi ciently sensitive to merit protection. And by no stretch of the most 
7 E.g., under the Press Complaints Commission Code of Practice and the Ofcom Broadcasting Code.
8 Wainwright v Home Offi ce  [2004] 2 AC 406 at para 19 per Lord Hoffmann. 
9 Penalising bogus celebrity endorsements: see Irvine v Talksport [2002] EMLR 32; [2003] EMLR 36 
(damages).
10 Coco v AN Clark (Engineers) Ltd [1968] FSR 415 at 419 per Megarry J.
11 [1990] 1 AC 109 at 281.
12 Creation Records Ltd v News Group Newspapers Ltd [1997] EMLR 444; Douglas v Hello [2006] QB 
125; Campbell v MGN [2004] 2 AC 457.
13 [2004] 2 AC 457 at para 14; see also H L MacQueen, “Protecting privacy” (2004) 8 EdinLR 420.
14 Douglas v Hello [2006] QB 125 at para 53 per Lord Phillips, echoing the term used by A Sims in “ ‘A 
shift in the centre of gravity’: the dangers of protecting privacy through breach of confi dence” 2005 
Intellectual Property Quarterly 27 at 51.
15 See, e.g., Peck v United Kingdom (2003) 36 EHRR 41.
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fl exible defi nition could the wrong suffered in Wainwight v United Kingdom,16 an 
inappropriate strip-search, be categorised as breach of confi dence or even as “misuse 
of private information” (the “essence” of breach of confi dence as now “encapsulated” 
in Campbell).17 Even now, therefore, breach of confi dence cannot be made to do all 
the work of a law of privacy.
B. THE IMPLICATIONS OF WAINWRIGHT v UNITED KINGDOM
The Wainwrights, mother and son, pursued a claim through the English courts 
after suffering a humiliating strip-search during a prison visit to another son of the 
family in January 1997. The prison offi cers involved had not followed the statutory 
procedures for such searches, and the Wainwrights were awarded damages in Leeds 
County Court for trespass to the person, on the basis that they had been caused to 
do something which infringed their right to privacy. That award was overturned by 
the Court of Appeal,18 whose decision was upheld in the House of Lords.19 Their 
Lordships declined counsel’s invitation to declare that a tort of invasion of privacy 
existed,20 and held that common law principle could not be extended to admit such a 
tort. In the absence of a general privacy tort, no other ground of liability was found,21 
although a modest, undisputed, sum was awarded to the son under the head of battery, 
since he had been touched inappropriately by an offi cer. In Lord Hoffmann’s view, 
there was nothing in the court’s reading of the jurisprudence of the European Court 
of Human Rights to suggest “that the adoption of some high level principle of privacy 
is necessary to comply with article 8 of the Convention”.22
The Wainwrights subsequently argued before the European Court of Human 
Rights that the strip-searches had infringed Article 3 (protecting against inhuman and 
degrading treatment) and Article 8 (protecting respect for private life) of the Conven-
tion. In its judgment, which was issued on 26 September 2006, 23 the Court distin-
guished between Article 3 and Article 8. The treatment received by the Wainwrights 
was not, it was said, suffi ciently extreme to be regarded as “degrading” within the 
meaning of Article 3, but it showed inadequate respect for their private life in terms 
of Article 8. The Wainwrights had been visiting a member of their family in the prison. 
Given the background of drug abuse among inmates at the prison, body searches 
might in principle have been justifi able, but the prison staff had failed to observe the 
proper procedures to protect the dignity of those being searched. Moreover, strip-
searching in this manner could not be regarded as “necessary in a democratic society”, 
within the meaning of Article 8(2). Consequently, the UK government had infringed 
16 Case 12350/04, ECtHR, 26 Sept 2006, The Times, 3 Oct 2006.
17 [2004] 2 AC 457, e.g. at para 14 per Lord Nicholls.
18 [2002] QB 1334.
19 [2004] 2 AC 406.
20 Para 35 per Lord Hoffmann.
21 The Wainwrights had also argued, unsuccessfully, that they had suffered intentional infl iction of distress, 
relying on the authority of Wilkinson v Downton [1897] 2 QB 57. 
22 Para 32.
23 Case 12350/04, ECtHR, 26 Sept 2006, The Times, 3 Oct 2006.
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Article 13 of the Convention (failure to provide an adequate remedy for violation of 
Convention rights).
Since the incident in question had occurred in 1997, before the Human Rights Act 
1998 came into force, Article 8 could not be directly invoked against the authorities 
responsible for the prison, and no alternative avenue was available to the Wainwrights 
in English law. The Court noted that:24
the House of Lords found that negligent action disclosed by the prison offi cers did not 
ground any civil liability, in particular as there was no general tort of invasion of privacy. 
In these circumstances, the Court fi nds that the applicants did not have available to them 
a means of obtaining redress for the interference with their rights under Article 8 of the 
Convention.
On this basis, damages were awarded to mother and son.
The problem brought into focus by Wainwright v UK is that privacy may be infringed 
in a way which violates Article 8; yet, in the absence of a general privacy tort, there are 
some situations in which the claimant may be left without a remedy in English law. 
While sections 6 and 7 of the Human Rights Act 1998 make Convention rights directly 
actionable against public authorities throughout the UK, that avenue is not open in 
disputes between private parties. Yet the European Court of Human Rights has previ-
ously ruled that Article 8 imposes a positive obligation on states “to secure respect for 
private life even in the sphere of the relations of individuals between themselves”.25 
Indeed, shortly after its decision in Wainwright, the House of Lords stated, in 
Campbell v MGN, that “the values underlying articles 8 and 10 are not confi ned to 
disputes between individuals and public authorities”.26 The immediate problem for 
English lawyers is therefore how the common law can make good any further gaps in 
the protection of rights secured under Article 8 – and indeed other Convention rights 
– in disputes between individuals. This might be done by the creation of a privacy of 
tort, or by further decanting of privacy into other categories. The question, however, 
is no longer whether this development is necessary, but how it can be achieved.
C.  COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE
In its continuing reluctance to give direct recognition to protection of privacy, England 
remains apart from other European jurisdictions. It is of course unlikely that Portalis 
and his colleagues had considered the possibility of egregious strip searches or lurid 
tabloid exposés when they set about composing the Code Napoléon. But, contrary to 
comparative law stereotype, in the codifi ed systems of mainland Europe it has often 
been judges rather than the legislators who have led in responding to changing social 
and cultural expectations by developing a case law on privacy through the interstices 
of the Code. In France, for example, the amendment of the Code civil to include 
the right to privacy in Article 927 is widely regarded as codifying well-established 
24 Para 55.
25 Von Hannover v Germany (2005) 40 EHRR 1, judgment of the court at 25, para 57. 
26 Campbell v MGN Ltd [2004] 2 AC 457 at para 18 per Lord Nicholls. 
27 Law 70-643 of 17 July 1970. Art 9 reads: “Chacun a droit au respect de sa vie privée.  Les juges peuvent, 
sans préjudice de la réparation du dommage subi, prescrire toutes mesures, telles que séquestre, saisie 
et autres, propres à empêcher ou faire cesser une atteinte à l’intimité de la vie privée...”.
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judge-made law.28 It is somewhat paradoxical that judicial creativity has been rather 
more inhibited in Europe’s leading Common Law jurisdiction. Moreover, England is 
becoming increasingly isolated even in the Common Law family. In the jurisdictions 
of the United States, a law of privacy has been recognised for a century or more, the 
New Zealand Court of Appeal has recently resolved to call privacy exactly that,29 and 
a Privacy Bill was laid before the Irish legislature in the summer of 2006.30
D. THE FUTURE FOR PRIVACY IN SCOTS LAW
Scotland, of course, has had its own “Wainwright”, in the form of the 1988 Outer 
House case of Henderson v Fife Police31 in which a woman detainee was awarded 
damages after being compelled to remove her bra while in police custody. Lord Jaunc-
ey’s judgment takes a broad-brush approach, reasoning that this was an invasion of 
“privacy and liberty”.32 Ironically, the central authority upon which he relied was an 
English case, also arising out of an inappropriate strip search – Lindley v Rutter.33 Both 
Henderson and Lindley were apparently cited to the House of Lords in Wainwright, 
although it is not clear why their Lordships were unpersuaded by them. Henderson 
apart, there is little evidence that protection for privacy is more securely established in 
Scotland than in England.34 Nonetheless, some important points of difference require 
comment.
(1) Privacy by other names: breach of confi dence
Like English law, Scots law protects privacy under a variety of other names. Defama-
tion, for instance, may be used,35 although the defence of veritas means that much 
that is private is outwith its reach. Passing off may well develop along the same lines 
as in the English courts. However, the use of breach of confi dence to make good gaps 
in protection of privacy is problematic. As Wainwright demonstrates, there are some 
aspects of an individual’s private life which cannot be categorised as confi dential infor-
mation. Additionally, in Scotland, where breach of confi dence is located in the law of 
28 This process is analysed in R Lindon, Les droits de la personnalite (1974) 64-67; H Beverley-Smith et al, 
Privacy, Property and Personality (2005) 147-153. On the role of the judges in developing protection for 
rights of personality in German law, see R Zimmermann, The Law of Obligations: Roman Foundations 
of the Civilian Tradition (1990) 1092-1094; H Beverley-Smith et al, Privacy, Property and Personality 
(2005) 113: “The vague language of these [codifi ed] provisions makes them impossible to apply by mere 
reference to the wording. Rather, these rules provide a frame for case-law the development of which 
has, in terms of legal methodology, a striking resemblance with the application of common law rules and 
principles.” 
29 Hosking v Runting [2005] 1 NZLR 1
30 Text available at http://www.oireachtas.ie/viewdoc.asp?fn=/documents/bills28/bills/2006/4406/docu-
ment1.htm.
31 1988 SLT 361; see H L MacQueen, “Protecting privacy” (2004) 8 EdinLR 249. 
32 At 367-368.
33 [1981] QB 128.
34 The most positive recent statement is perhaps Lord Bonomy’s observation in Martin v McGuiness 2003 
SLT 1424 at para 28: “Of course it does not follow that, because a specifi c right to privacy has not so far 
been recognised, such a right does not fall within existing principles of the law. Signifi cantly my attention 
was not drawn to any case in which it was said in terms that there is no right to privacy.”  
35 E.g., Robertson v Keith 1936 SC 29.
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delict,36 while there may be authority for the extension of confi dentiality to a third 
party receiving information knowing it to be confi dential,37 there no clear authority 
to extend it in the open-ended way now apparently accepted for English law by the 
House of Lords in Campbell v MGN. Indeed there is at least Outer House authority 
doubting the basis for such extension.38
(2) Recognition of privacy in Scots Law?
As argued previously in this journal, 39 Scots law, unlike English law, cannot be charac-
terised as primarily a remedy-based system, and the forms of action, which have 
constrained the development of new English torts, have no counterpart in Scots law. 
Of course, there is no disputing the substantial convergence of the English and Scots 
law of negligence, and the structural resemblance between the intentional delicts and 
the English torts as a “tangle of crisscrossing categories”.40 However, the “intellectual 
superstructure”41 of the law of delict remains distinct from that of the English law of 
torts. The law of delict remains in the singular, and the nominate heads of liability 
are underpinned by general principle.42 Thus there are no structural reasons why 
the list of protected interests should be regarded as closed, and it may exception-
ally be capable of further development if there are cogent reasons why a particular 
category should be recognised.43 There is therefore no compelling need for Scots law 
to “shoe-horn” protection of privacy into another ill-fi tting category of liability, and 
certainly no assistance to be derived from the law of equity in so doing. Equally, there 
is no fundamental reason why, if privacy requires recognition, as evidently it does in 
terms of Article 8, the Scots courts must share the squeamishness of the English in 
pronouncing the “P word”. Doing so may permit them to articulate more clearly not 




36 And so not, as in England, in equity. See, e.g., M Earle and N R Whitty, “Medical Law”, in The Laws of 
Scotland: Stair Memorial Encyclopaedia, Reissue (2006) para 299.
37 See Lord Advocate v Scotsman Publications 1989 SC (HL) 122 at 164 per Lord Keith.
38 Quilty v Windsor 1999 SLT 346 at 356 per Lord Kingarth, commenting on Lord Goff’s remarks in 
Attorney General v Guardian Newspapers (text to n 11 above) .
39 N R Whitty, “From rules to discretion: changes in the fabric of Scots private law” (2003) 7 EdinLR 
281.
40 P Birks, “Harassment and hubris” (1997) 31 Irish Jurist 1 at 32.
41 See H L MacQueen and W D H Sellar, “Negligence”, in K Reid and R Zimmermann (eds), A History 
of Private Law in Scotland  (2000) vol 2, 517 at 547.
42 K McK Norrie, “History and function of delict”, in The Laws of Scotland: Stair Memorial Encyclopaedia 
vol 15 (1996) para 213. On the development of general principle from the writings of the institutional 
writers, see D W McKenzie and R Evans-Jones, “The development of remedies for personal injury and 
death”, in R Evans-Jones (ed), The Civil Law Tradition in Scotland (1995) 277 at 286 ff. 
43 See, e.g., Micosta SA v Shetland Islands Council 1986 SLT 193 at 198 per Lord Ross, under reference 
to D M Walker, The Law of Delict in Scotland, 2nd edn (1981) 9; Report of the Committee on Privacy 
(Cmnd 5012: 1972) 306: “…in Scotland it has been said that the remedy depends upon the right rather 
than upon the remedy as in England, and, the Scottish Court might grant a remedy in an extreme case 
even though the remedy had never been granted before.”
44 Notably in terms of ECHR Arts 8(2) and 10.
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